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ARoad Less
Traveled to a
Federal ERA

~

en Congress's deadline expired in 1982, the Federal
Equal Rights Amendment was still three states
short of the Constitutionally required number for
ratification. If that deadline had any meaning, it had to be
that those favoring a Federal ERA would have to begin again
the process set forth in Article V, either by reintroducing the
amendment in Congress, or by obtaining support by enough
states for a constitutional convention.
An equal rights amendment was first introduced in Congress in 1923, shortly after ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment afforded women a Constitutional guarantee of
suffrage. It was reintroduced in every Congress from 1924 to
1970. Asubcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee first
reported favorably on the amendment in 1936, and subcommittees in both houses reported favorably the following year.
In its present form, the ERA passed the Senate in 1946 by
three votes. With the so-called Hayden rider (preserving laws
benefitting or exempting women) attached, the amendment
passed the Senate again in both 1950 and 1953. The amendment failed to secure the requisite two-thirds necessary for
submission to the states until1972.

ERA's Route Through Congress
by John Paul Jones

The Congressional route, which brought ratification so
near in 1982, seems still the favored one. On January 14, 1991,
forty-eight Senators co-sponsored a Senate Joint Resolution
proposing to the states a constitutional amendment phrased
exactly like that which failed ratification in 1982. On the same
day, 129 Members of the House did likewise. So, the campaign
begins again. The question remains where is and should it be
going?
Were the question put in 1982, a ratificationist would have
answered by saying that we still need an ERA and should
prepare to go the distance to see it ratified. As a ratificationist,
I would have urged the struggle forward in 1982 on the basis
of the following legal argument.

Ratificationist Says Need for ERA Unchanged
America needs an ERA as much now as ever. Neither
safeguards in the United States Constitution's Fifth and
Fourteenth amendments nor guarantees in federal civil rights
statutes like Title VII and Title IX are enough to guarantee
that the past won't repeat itself. Only a generation ago, the
United States Supreme Court could resort to blatant sexual
stereotypes in upholding a law excluding women from licensing as bartenders. Only a generation ago, Congress could
complacently turn a blind eye to the systematic exclusion of
women from education and commerce.
Just as history entitles Jews to fear a future pogrom,
history also entitles women to fear re-imprisonment in the
seraglio. All that women really have today in America is a
promise by a predominantly male government that federal
law will ensure their rights. But, in the long run, who will
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ensure those rights against the very men who make such a
promise? Only the Constitution can legally inhibit our national legislature. So, unless the ERA is passed, women's
rights remain vulnerable to the first misogynic Congress that
comes along.
An anti-ratificationist, on the other hand, would have
answered in 1982 that another battle for the ERA would not be
worth the candle. As an anti-ratificationist twenty years ago,
I would have based my resistance to reviving the ERA on the
following legal argument.

Anti-Ratificationist says ERA Moot

I

I

An ERA in the eighties would add little, if anything, to the
status afforded women by existing law. As several post-mortems
on the ratification campaign of the seventies have demonstrated, the United States Supreme Court had become
decidedly hostile to sex discrimination by 1982. In a series of
decisions beginningwithReedv. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)(invalidating an Idaho law which preferred men for court
appointments as estate administrators) which continued at
least through Wenglerv. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446
U.S. 142 (1980)(invalidating Missouri law which provided
death benefits to all workers' widows but only to worker's
widowers who could prove dependency), the Supreme Court
used the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to strike down a
variety of laws discriminating against women.
By Wengler, the Court had made clear its intenJJ;o afford
women almost the same judicial protection from discrimination that, in keeping with the evident purpose of the Fourteenth
amendment, it afforded the descendants of former slaves.
Indeed, if the Court's statements in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351 (1974) (upholding Florida property tax exemption for
widows but not widowers because of the financial straits in
which widows commonly were found) and Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding Navy regulations
which allowed women officers who had been passed over for
promotion to remain in the service longer than men in light of
the barriers to assignment of women to career enhancing sea
or combat duties) were compared with the several opinions in
Regents of the University v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), such
a comparison would readily lead to the conclusion that the
Court would be more likely to find women entitled to affirmative action than black Americans. If, in the eighties, women
already enjoy at least the equal protection of laws, what
marginal advantage couldjustifyanother bitter ERA struggle?
Let well enough alone.

Climate Change for 1990's
But here we are in the 1990's, and what, if anything, has
changed? Someone else might speak competently to the
political arguments by both ratificationist and antiratificationist. I will speak to their legal arguments.
The legal argument of the ratificationist remains the same
in the continued absence of a Constitutional amendment.
Nothing much has changed: the rights of women to equality in
various settings continue to exist by legislative grace. Indeed,

the new Civil Rights Act of 1991 enhances such rights in
important ways, and seems to renew the pledge that women's
equality is safe in the hands of Congress.
On the other hand, the assurances of the anti-ratificationist
that the Supreme Court does not need an explicit amendment
to enforce sexual equality ring less true with each succeeding
Supreme Court term. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.Ct. 1759 (1991)
(upholding U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
regulations which severely restricted, in non-profit family
planning clinics accepting federal funds, a physician's discretion to furnish a patient with abortion-related advice) was a
stupendous decision, not only because of its implications for
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and the right to abortion
freedom, but also because of what the Court said about free
speech and judicial control of lawmaking. The Rust decision
is no freak. From one end of the Bill of Rights to the other, the
Rehnquist Court has, especially in the last two terms, been
riding rough-shod. Mter cases like Rust, Employment Div. v.
Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990) (holding against religious discrimination claim Oregon's refusal of unemployment
compensation to two members of the Native American Church
fired for sacramental consumption ofpeyote),Barnesv. Glen
Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456 ( 1991) (holding against First Amendment free expression claim Indiana's public indecency law as
applied to non-obscene live nude dancing) and California v.
HodariD, 111 S. Ct.1547 (1991) (Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable arrest does not apply to police chase
beforehand), I am no longer at ease entrusting my own--or
anybody else's-rights to an inference drawn by the United
States Supreme Court.

Addition of Clarence Thomas
Justice Thomas's presence seems to bode especially ill for
the rights of women, as his recent opinion for the D.C. Circuit
Court in Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992),
clearly evidences. So, if you can't trust the Congress to ensure
women's equality under the law, you can't trust today's Supreme Court either. Neither civil rights laws in the hands of
Congress nor the constitutional amendment in the hands of
the Supreme Court can offer complete security, but, like abelt
with suspenders, having both can make very unlikely their
simultaneous failure. An ERA would present both Congress
and the Court with an explicit statement of Constitutional
guarantee, not simply a permissible inference of one.

Bleak Future for ERA
So what future do I see for a revived ERA campaign?
Frankly, I see little chance of success. Over ten thousand
amendments have been proposed in just over 200 years. Only
twenty-seven have been added to our Constitution. Considering that two thirds of both houses must endorse any amendment
Congress proposes to the states, the process for amendment is
arguably biased against amendment. Then, three fourths of
the states, acting either through their legislatures or through
conventions called for the exclusive purpose, must vote to
ratify.
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For an amendment like the ERA that restricts government,
that's a lot of legislators selflessly agreeing to limit their own
lawmaking prerogatives. As few as thirteen state representatives could frustrate ratification, were each to cast a single nay
vote in a different state. Small wonder that the subject of four
of the sixteen amendments since the Bill of Rights has been
the presidency, a lawmaking institution that has no role in the
amending process. Small wonder that another amendment,
the Eleventh, restricts the federal courts, another lawmaking
institution with no role in the amending process.

Grassroots Reform has Poor Track Record
The only successful grassroots effort to take power from
those with Article Vpower was the Eighteenth (Prohibition)
amendment. That amendment in effect said that courts would
make sure neither Congress nor the states permitted liquor
sales. Arguably, such an amendment could only have succeeded in an era before Congress and the state legislatures
had experienced significant judicial encroachments on their
authority.
Today, legislators, particularly state legislators, can look
back in frustration at numerous instances of judicial meddling in cases involving bussing, school prayer, pornography,
and, of course, abortion. One might point to the Reconstruction amendments as other examples of successful curtailments
of state legislatures. But, to do so is to substantially underestimate the intimidation by occupying Federal troops on the
amendment decisions of former Confederate states. We are
not likely to see Federal troops lining the chambers when
state legislatures debate the ERA.

Legislators Wary of Yielding Power
These days, I think state legislators are considerably more
wary of granting, by federal constitutional amendment, a
judicial license to nullify their lawmaking. I can hear state
lawmakers asking ratificationists why they trust judges more
than the very elected representatives whose ratification votes
they are courting. Of course, recent decisions by the Rehnquist
Court can be cited to attenuate the shibboleth of judicial
interference, but it will surely take a decade or more for the
new jurisprudence to permeate the psyches of local lawmakers. By that time, the new amendment would be likely to
receive no warmer a Supreme Court reception than the equal
protection clause received initially inPlessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana law requiring racially
segregated accommodations in railroad trains).
I don't take much comfort from senators and representatives lining up in Congress to sponsor the joint resolution
proposing the ERA again. In the first place, theirs is a no-lose
position; after all, if they secretly oppose ratification, they can
always rely on their brothers in the state houses to withhold
the necessary assents. In the second place, Congress has little
to lose even if the amendment is ratified. The United States
Supreme Court has exhibited the greatest reluctance when
called upon to review a legislative act of Congress, much more
reluctance than it has shown when invited to discipline states.

i

Every indication is that the Supreme Court of the near future
will be even more deferential to the lawmakers across First
Street.
In short, while the need for the amendment is greater now
than when it failed ratification in 1982, the opposing odds
seem just as great. What remains are two variables: first, how
important is it to carry on courageously a political campaign,
which even if it must fail, is surely the right thing to do; and
second, to what extent must we always expect legislators to
act selfishly? In 1919, I would never have predicted that men
could be induced into sharing with women the power of the
franchise, and yet they-we-did, by ratifying the Nineteenth Amendment.

International Lawmaking Provides An
Alternative
There is an interesting third option. In 1979, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted and opened for signature
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1249 U.N.T.S. 14). It went into force on
September 3, 1981.
The Convention is comprehensive in scope, prohibiting:
[A)ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on
the basis of sex that has the effect or purpose of
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise by women, regardless of their marital status,
on the basis of equality of men and women, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.
The Convention obligates signatory states to pursue "without delay" a policy of eliminating discrimination against women
"by any person, organization, or enterprise," by taking "all
appropriate measures including legislation." At the same
time, the Convention authorizes what we domestically know
as affirmative action by permitting "temporary special measures" to acceleratedejacto equality between men and women
that would otherwise constitute sex discrimination. Moreover, the Convention obligates each signatory state to "take
appropriate measures" to alter social and cultural norms to
eliminate stereotypes and sex prejudice.
The Convention imposes in international law specific duties to combat discrimination in many areas already covered
by federal civil rights law such as politics and suffrage, citizenship, education, employment, and social benefits. While the
Convention calls specifically for an end to discrimination
against women in health care, it also requires signatory states
to provide all women with adequate nutrition and services
during pregnancy and the post-natal period.

Across-the-Board Equality
Silent on abortion per se, the Convention calls for women's
equality in all matters relating to family and marriage. It
creates for women a right "to decide freely and responsibly on
the number and spacing of their children and to have access
to the information, education and means to enable them to
~nmmer
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exercise these rights." Signatory states must report regularly
to the United Nations on their progress toward fulfilling the
many specific obligations set forth in the Convention. Aseparate international committee of experts will scrutinize these
reports and comment on them to the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women. In short, the Convention is an
omnibus effort to end discrimination against women around
the world.

Americans Active at Drafting
Representatives of the United States participated actively
in the drafting of this Convention, and President Carter signed
it on behalf of the United States on July 17, 1980. He transmitted it (along with a State Department report on its potential
consequences for American law) to the Senate for advice and
consent four months later, but the 96th Senate took no action,
and no Senate has acted since. No hearings were conducted
for eight years after the Senate received the Convention. The
first hearings were held in 1988, and more were held by the
101st Congress in 1990.

Senate Consent Not Yet Forthcoming
Internationally, the Convention went into force in 1981,
(Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General
at 151, U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER. E/3, art. 27(1) (Dec. 31,
1984)). One hundred and ten countries had ratified the
Convention by March 18, 1992 but, without Senate consent
and Presidential ratification, it has not yet become the law of
the United States.
The 102th Senate is blaming the delay on the White House,
because neither President Reagan nor President Bush has
ever offered the Senate their administration's reservations,
understandings, and declarations (as President Carter did in
Secretary of State Muskie's Memorandum). The Senate apparently deems the views of the White House essential to
Senate consent.

Preemptive Etl'ect on State Law
By the Federal Constitution's Supremacy Clause, the Convention, once ratified, would, like any treaty, override any
conflicting state law. It would thereby establish, at least as
well as the ERA, sex equality in every state. The Convention
would also hold the Congress to its civil rights promises, more
than would an ordinary federal law, albeit less than a constitutional amendment. Theoretically, Congress could act to
abrogate the treaty, but resistance, both institutional and
public, to reneging on formal promises made in the community of nations ought to be much greater than resistance to the
repeal of a dome~ tic civil rights act.

Shortcut to Approval
What attracts me about the Convention is thatit needs only
federal action, that is consent by the Senate and signature by
the President. Neither the House of Representatives nor the
state legislatures act on treaties or international agreements.
The Convention could therefore become the law of the land

without lobbying state legislators, the lawmakers most likely
to suffer its consequences and most resistant to an ERA.
Persuading one President and sixty seven members of the
national upper house that a single law ought to apply nationwide is a much more manageable lobbying effort, not only
because of the limited numbers and single location, but also
because of the nature of the offices.
Both the Presidency and the Senate are national offices
whose occupants should be unintimidated by new bans on sex
discrimination. Federal civil rights laws have already established equality as a legal norm in the major areas of federal
lawmaking. The Government Employment Acts of 1991 (Pub.
L. No. 102, 106 Stat. 3 (1991)) extended to employees of the
Senate protection from gender discrimination similar to that
afforded other employees by Title VII. In Da~ v. P~n,
442 U.S. 228 (1979), for example, the Supreme Court held a
Congressman liable under the Fifth Amendment for gender
discrimination in staff promotion and hiring.
Nor are the President and Senators likely to be sympathetic enough to state autonomy to resist ratification lobbying
like state legislators would. While Presidents are formally
chosen by an electoral college assembled according to procedures dictated by state legislatures, the Presidential two-term
limitation and the electoral college's deep-seated tradition of
following the popular vote prevent state legislators from
commanding any loyalty from the oval office.
Once the Federal Constitution provided for the selection of
Senators by state legislatures, and those selected were therefore naturally responsive to the preferences of those in the
state houses who held the power of reappointment. Passage of
the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, however, providing for
popular election of the Senate, emancipated the members of
the national upper house from servitude to the controlling
factions in state legislatures. This change surely left Senators
less sensitive to concerns about subordinating state autonomy
to their views of the national interest. Thus, neither the
President nor thirty-four senators ought to oppose the Convention as much as some state legislators opposed the ERA.
They lack the stake and they risk much greater exposure.

Some Critical Drawbacks
As a way of outlawing discrimination against women in this
country, ratification of an international convention is not
without its drawbacks. There is, first, the problem of White
House procrastination. Some senators feel constrained, or at
least claim to feel constrained, to withhold consent in the
absence of formal interpretation by the current administration. No such constraint appears on the face of the Constitution,
but Presidential practice oflate has conditioned the Senate to
demand some sort of statement by the White House as to how
the Executive Branch plans to interpret that to which the
Senate consents. For example, President Reagan's 1985 reintrepretation oftheABM Treaty to permit certain research in
conjunction with the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars")
took many in the Senate by surprise.This understanding of the
scope of the treaty clearly differed from the Senate's interpre-

tation a decade earlier, as evidenced by Senate debates at the
time of its consent. It brought to a head Constitutional issues
of whether the Senate's interpretation, at the time it gives
consent to a treaty, binds the executive branch then or
thereafter, and whether an interpretation, offered the Senate
by the Executive branch, binds either the administration
which offers it or any which follow.
These two, as yet unresolved, issues obviously prompt the
Senate to pry out of the White House as definitive a statement
of what the White House thinks the agreement means as the
Senate can get. While the Senate rightfully evinces concern
for harmony between the branches as to the interpretation of
an international agreement, inaction in Congress is only one
of several responses to silence in the White House. When more
than a decade passes without Senate consent, Senate inaction
begins to suggest inter-branch concert rather than conflict.
Once the Senate gives its consent, the President becomes the
exclusive object of lobbying efforts, for only his signature is
then lacking to achieve ratification.

No Interpretive Conflict
If the Senate's concern is that a present or future administration will eventually interpret the Convention in some
important way different from the interpretation offered by the
Carter administration, nothing is gained by waiting around for
a memorandum that seems unlikely to issue from the Bush
administration.
No interpretive conflict now exists, so a ratified Convention should appear a better alternative than a non-ratified
Convention to a Senate already on record as enthusiastically
in favor of ending sex discrimination by Constitutional amendment. More than most subjects ofinternational agreements, a
human rights convention virtually guarantees a continuing
interpretative role for the domestic lawmaking body, so the
Senate need not fear corruption of the Convention by subsequent conflicting interpretation in the White House.
Asecond problem for those backing the UN Convention is
limiting reservations and conditions. Although the Constitution is silent on the matter, the Senate has the power to
impose conditions on its consent to a treaty or other international agreement. Such conditions have come to be expressed
in either of two ways: by insisting in the ratification resolution
that the President amend the text of the treaty upon ratification, or else by inserting additional material in the ratification
resolution itself.
Conditions imposed by the Senate cannot be incompatible
with the object and purpose of the agreement. The widespread practice of reservation among signatory states has
particularly plagued the Convention to End All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women. By last summer, one commentator could report that at least twenty-three states had
made a total of eighty-eight reservations to the rights guaranteed by the Convention and another twenty-five states had
opted out of procedure for dispute resolution. The Senate
needs to be convinced of the rectitude of consent without
much-if any-reservation.

State Department Review
In the Memorandum attached by President Carter to the
Convention for transmittal to the Senate, the State Department reviewed the Convention and its impact on U.S. law.
Where a likely conflict could be discerned, the Department
suggested alternative resolutions: either legislation bringing
domestic law into compliance with international obligations
under the Convention or else Senate reservation to limit the
Convention's U.S. impact short of its intended global reach.
One issue for which reservation is a suggested solution is
whether the Convention has force in areas of law traditionally
left to the individual states. Those opposed to the principles
underlying both the ERA and the Convention are very likely to
raise states' rights objections to an international agreement
capable of nullifying state laws which discriminate in areas
like marriage, family, and private associations.
Such objections have been persuasively criticized as specious, but they nevertheless have a potential for distracting
some Senators or furnishing others an apparently principled
excuse for a reservation. The more such reservations are
fashioned, the less the Convention will do in the United States,
so it obviously behooves the advocates of ratification to insist
the fewest conditions.
While the threat to the Convention of enervating reservations is a real one, as both international practice and the State
Department memorandum make clear, it does not change the
underlying assessment that makes the Convention an appropriate goal for supporters of a national ERA. The advantage
offered by Convention ratification over amendment ratification is still there - only the Senate and President, and not
thirty-eight state legislatures, must be persuaded right now.
While endorsement by states and the House of Representatives would make the task of persuading first the Senate,
and then the President easier, the absence of such endorsements is no real impediment to action by either. The Senate
is already on record as favoring a Federal ERA, and its underlying principles.

Art of the Possible
Nothing suggests that a state-by-state ERA campaign could
secure ratification in the near future when it could not in the
decade before 1982. It is therefore even riskier for those
dedicated to women's rights to embark on such a campaign a
second time. Instead of proceeding directly toward Constitutional amendment, I propose a crooked road that begins with
ratification of the United Nations Convention to End All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women. One hundred and
ten nations have already made the Convention part of their
domestic law, and it has been international law among the
signatory nations since 1981. Ratification of the Convention
does not require the assent of the several states, only the
consent of the Senate and the signature of the President.
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Freedom of Speech
Continued from page 36

Continued from page 40

time came, after fourteen sleepless nights, the two hours that
we set aside grew to five.
It was a nightmare; Bill was doing a Westlaw search on all
the cases that we cited; Esther was "bleeding all over the
pages" as she edited with a red pen. I was frantically trying to
type in her corrections, and Stuart was running all over the
library to locate the correct cites that were incomplete in our
drafts. However, at 5:30 p.m. on a Friday afternoon, the
(somewhat) complete document was turned over to both
Eileen and Professor Jones. None of the rest of us ever wanted
to see it again for quite some time.
Unfortunately, our wish was not quite granted. Several
days later, the four of us sat with Professor Jones and spent
four quality hours editing the final text. Eileen had transposed what we had written with a brief that she had done.
(She somehow managed to put the whole paper together over
the weekend.)
The end result was a small book that we felt was quite well
written. Now that the project is over, I feel that I must admit
that each time VMI objected to some part of our brief and
especiallywhen the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the
case, the four of us experienced a bit of pure delight. We will
always be thankful to Eileen Wagner and Professor Jones for
giving us the opportunity to work on the brief and the chance
to work with them. 0

distinguished between "mere advocacy" of illegal activity and
remarks which are "likely to incite or produce such actions."
Language that is merely offensive or derogatory arguably does
not even reach the level of the former.
Limitation on freedom of expression in the university
setting has been viewed by such scholars as law professor
Gerald Gunther of Stanford as being "... not only incompatible
with the mission and meaning of a university... (but) also
send(ing) exactly the wrong message from academia to society as a whole."
Former Yale President Benno C. Schmidt, Jr. has warned
against the unleashing of a "vague and unpredictable empire
of suppression" by unjustifiably stretching the line of true
threats and fighting words" to include offensive speech in
general. And the restructuring of traditional curricula (on the
issue of race, gender, and ethnicity) to accommodate those
faculty who have their own agenda of what is the "greater
good" of those who exercise political clout with respect to
university policy, and the promulgation of anti-harassment
codes has been labeled as "cross(ing) the line that separates
the legal from the illegal" by a distinguished professor of law
at one non-Virginia public university.
The public university in particular has been somewhat set
aside for special First Amendment treatment, regarded as a
"haven of free speech."
These remarks are not to infer that racist, sexist, or
ethnically abusive language is to be condoned or encouraged
in the academic community or elsewhere, or to disparage the
well-directed efforts of those persons endeavoring to eliminate such language. These efforts, however, must be tempered
with the recognition that free and unfettered expression is a
right constitutionally insured and that demeaning and derogatory language often must be tolerated when uttered in the
public domain.
The decisions invalidating the G.M.U. activity and the
speech codes at the Universities of Wisconsin and Michigan
did not implicitly or explicitly indicate the courts' approvals,
but rather their acknowledgment of the constitational protection which extends to such acts and/or remarks.
Professor Gunther's conclusion best explicates the purpose for the premise that university campuses should assure
greater, rather than less, freedom of speech than is acceptable
by society in general: "I believe-in my heart as well as my
mind-that these principles and ideals (i.e., the assurance of
free expression in the academic setting) are not only established but right. I hope that the entire academic community
will seriously reflect upon the risks to free expression, lest we
weaken hard-won liberties at our universities and, by example, in this nation." 0

Road
Continued from page 45

Unlike an ERA ratification campaign, a campaign to secure
ratification of the Convention can therefore be concentrated
in Washington. The Senate is already on record as supporting
the ERA, and should therefore be especially susceptible to
arguments that the Convention accomplishes much of what
the Senate endorsed in proposing an ERA to the states in every
year since 1984.
Once the Convention is ratified, it becomes a powerful
lever for both expansion of Federal Civil Rights proscriptions
into areas of sex discrimination previously deemed the business of the several states, and for explicit recognition of
women's rights in a Federal Constitutional amendment. 0

